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SUPREME COURT NO. 860430 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF'S DILIGENCE, AND THE STATE'S 
MISREPRESENTATION, WERE ISSUES WHICH 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE TRIER 
OF FACT 
Flinders, in his brief, has asserted that he listed 
the State of Utah and its address on the accident report form, 
and claims such fact as sufficient to support summary judgment 
in his favor. However, he concedes that "[t]here was 
uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff's investigator asked the 
State Division of Personnel Management whether Mr. Flinders was 
a state employee and that someone at the Division told the 
- 2 -
i n v e s t i g a t o r t h a t Mr . F l i n d e r s was n o t an e m p l o y e e . " 
( R e s p o n d e n t ' s B r i e f , a t 3 . ) In a d d i t i o n , M r s . F o r s m a n ' s 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s e n t l e t t e r s b o t h t o t h e a d d r e s s g i v e n in t h e 
a c c i d e n t r e p o r t and an add re s s ob t a ined from the D r i v e r s ' License 
D i v i s i o n , and both l e t t e r s were r e t u r n e d . (R .208 . ) The q u e s t i o n 
of the r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of Mrs. Forsman's a c t i o n s i s not a q u e s t i o n 
t o be d e c i d e d as a m a t t e r of law, but one which should have been 
submit ted to the t r i e r of f a c t Jo rgensen v . Skaggs, 668 P.2d 
565 (Utah 1983); B u t l e r v . S p o r t s Haven I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 563 
P.2d 1245 (Utah 1977) . 
Flinders attempts to distinguish this case from 
Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978), by 
asserting that in Vincent, when the Plaintiffs discovered the 
county's misrepresentation, they subsequently filed a notice 
of their claim. Flinders' argument overlooks the fact that in 
this action Mrs. Forsman did not discover that Flinders was a 
state employee until after the Complaint was filed, a fact 
which she should have been permitted to prove at trial. To have 
filed the notice after filinq of the Complaint would have been 
a meaninqless exercise, given the purpose of the notice 
requirement: 
The various reasons advanced for the 
adoption of the claim statute [are] to 
afford the agency an opportunity to 
investigate the merits of the claim, 
and to arrive at a settlement, thus 
avoiding litigation... Hence the 
filing of the claim... is nothing 
more than a procedural require-
ment as to the agency, which, as to 
the claimant, may be excused by estoppel. 
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Rice v . G r a n i t e School D i s t r i c t , 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 
(1969), at 162 (emphasis added). 
F l i n d e r s ' a t tempt to d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s case from Myers 
v . McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1 9 8 1 ) , must a l s o f a i l . In 
Myers , t h e P l a i n t i f f d id no t know t h a t a c a u s e of a c t i o n 
e x i s t e d a g a i n s t anyone a t the t ime the l i m i t a t i o n s period had 
r u n , under a s t a t u t e a p p l i c a b l e to causes of a c t i o n a g a i n s t 
a n y o n e . (U.C.A. Sec. 7 8 - 1 2 - 2 8 ) . In t h i s c a s e , Mrs. Forsman 
did not know tha t her cause of act ion was against a s t a t e 
£IE£:L ° X££ u n t i l a f t e r t h e p e r i o d had r u n , under a s t a t u t e 
requir ing not ice where the act ion was against a s t a t e 
employee . (U.C.A. S e c . 6 3 - 3 0 - 1 2 ) . Thus, in both Myers and 
the p r e s e n t a c t i o n , the P l a i n t i f f ' s lack of knowledge was with 
r e s p e c t t o e x a c t l y t h e p o i n t which was c r i t i c a l under the 
appl icable s t a t u t e . 
F i n a l l y , F l i n d e r s a rgues t h a t t h e r e i s no evidence 
t h a t t h e s t a t e a c t e d t o c o n c e a l t h e t r u t h from P l a i n t i f f 
"purpose ly to avoid any l i a b i l i t y . " (Responden t ' s Br ie f , a t 
5 ) . However, the s t a t e ' s s c i e n t e r i s simply not a t i s sue in 
t h i s case . In Myers v. McDonald, supra, i t was sa id : 
If p l a i n t i f f s are unable to prove t h e i r 
a l l ega t i ons of due d i l igence a t t r i a l , 
t h i s act ion would s t i l l be barred by the 
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s unless p l a i n t i f f s 
can preva i l by proof of t h e i r a l t e r n a t e 
theory of concealment or misleading by 
defendant. 
I_<3_*_ a t 87 . Under t h e f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e , the f a c t u a l i s sue 
i s t h e s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e £i£iHJE. ALLlJL a c t i o n s under t h e 
circumstances, not the State of Utah's i n t e n t . Under the second 
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a l t e r n a t i v e , the f a c t u a l i s s u e i s whether the S t a t e of Utah 
concealed or misled, not the s t a t e ' s purpose, i n t e n t , or reasons 
for doing so . 
Mrs. Forsman should be given the opportunity to prove 
to the trier of fact her due diligence in attempting to discover 
whether Flinders was an employee of the State of Utah, and the 
fact of false statements having been made by the State of Utah. 
POINT II 
THE LAW OF CALIFORNIA, THE STATE WITH 
THE GREATEST INTEREST, SHOULD BE APPLIED 
TO DETERMINE THE RIGHT OF ONE DOMICILIARY 
SPOUSE TO SUE ANOTHER 
The R e s t a t e m e n t (Second) of C o n f l i c t of Laws, S e c . 169 
( s e t f o r t h f u l l y in Mrs . F o r s m a n ' s main b r i e f , a t 1 0 - 1 1 ) , s t a t e s 
t h a t " [ t ] h e a p p l i c a b l e law [as t o i n t r a - f a m i l y immuni ty i s s u e s ] 
w i l l u s u a l l y b e t h e l o c a l l a w of t h e s t a t e of t h e p a r t i e s 1 
d o m i c i l . " 
M r s . F o r s m a n h a s c i t e d no h o l d i n g s o f t h i s C o u r t 
r e j e c t i n g t h e R e s t a t e m e n t v i e w . Madison v . D e s e r e t L i v e s t o c k 
C o . , 574 F . 2 d 1027 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , a T e n t h C i r c u i t c a s e c i t e d by Mr. 
F o r s m a n , was c o n c e r n e d n o t w i t h i n t e r - s p o u s a l o r i n t r a - f a m i l y 
i m m u n i t y i s s u e s , b u t w i t h a w i f e ' s a c t i o n a g a i n s t a t h i r d p a r t y 
f o r t h e l o s s of c a r e , c o n s i d e r a t i o n and s o c i e t y of h e r h u s b a n d , 
and h e r e m o t i o n a l d i s t r e s s c a u s e d by v i e w i n g h i s s u f f e r i n g and 
i n j u r i e s . M a ^ j ^ o i i d i d n o t d e a l w i t h t h e i n c i d e n t s o f t h e 
m a r r i a g e r e l a t i o n s h i p a s b e t w e e n t h e p a r t i e s t o t h a t 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , which i s e x a c t l y what t h i s a c t i o n d o e s c o n c e r n . 
As s a i d i n t h e c o m m e n t s t o S e c t i o n 169 o f t h e 
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Restatement (Second ) : 
[T]he state of the parties1 domicil will 
almost always be the state of dominant 
interest, and, if so, its local law should 
be applied to determine whether there is 
immunity in the particular case. 
Id. , Comment b. Mr. Forsman has cited nothing in the facts 
of this case which would give the State of Utah a 
greater-than-normal interest in regulating the incidents of a 
marriage between California domiciliaries. As the California 
Supreme Court said in Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1955), 
[The state of domicile] has the primary 
responsibility for establishing and 
regulating the incidents of the family 
relationship ... [I]t is undesirable that 
the rights, duties, disabilities, and 
immunities conferred or imposed by the 
family relationship should constantly 
change as members of the family 
cross state boundaries during temporary 
absences from their home. 
Id. at 223. 
Mr. Forsman contends that to follow the Restatement 
approach would lead to "undue complexity and uncertainty." 
(Respondent's Brief, at 19.) This argument was answered in 
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968), a 
case with facts identical to those at bar, where the Arizona 
Supreme Court said: 
Our holding that New York law should 
govern the issue of interspousal suits 
does not mean that Arizona law may not 
be applied to other issues of the case, 
e.g. determination of negligence. In 
Wilcox [v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 
133 N.W. 2d 408 (1965), involving the 
Wisconsin guest statute] , the practice 
of applying one state's law to one aspect 
of the case while applying the law of 
-6-
another state to another aspect was 
specifically approved: 
"It is obvious that one state 
may have a legitimate concern 
with one facet or issue of the 
case, but not with another, and 
hence we conclude that it is not 
necessary in each case to apply 
only the law of a single state 
to all phases of the lawsuit, 
i.e., what is negligence, for 
example, may well involve the 
application of the rules of the 
road of the tort state since it 
is that state that is primarily 
concerned with safety on its 
highways." 133 N.W. 2d at 415. 
Id. at 258. 
Utah's interest in this case is in requlating the 
safety of its highways. Utah has no interest in regulating the 
marital harmony or dissonance between residents of California. 
Regulation of the latter is California's concern, and should 
not be prevented merely because of occurrences during a temporary 
visit to the State of Utah. 
POINT III 
THE PUBLIC POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR RETAINING 
THE DOCTRINE OF INTER-SPOUSAL IMMUNITY 
SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
Although Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 
P. 2d 389 (1963), denying one spouse the right to sue the other 
for negligence, has not been specifically overruled, it is 
inconsistent with the logic and policy of this Court, as 
reflected in its more recent decisions. Strong policy reasons 
exist for allowing negligent actions between spouses. The policy 
reasons for denying such actions are questionable or obsolete, 
and serve merely to bar meritorious claims. 
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1 . Marital Harmony 
Mr. Forsman argues that the interspousal immunity 
doctrine promotes marital harmony. Such an assertion defies 
logic. As stated in Sanf ord , P e r j> o n a 1 _T o £ t.^ _W i^  t. hi jin _t h e 
Family, 9 Vanderbilt Law Review 823 (1956): 
[A]ctions [between family members] will be 
brought in only two circumstances: either 
the happy home will have already been 
disrupted, either by the act complained 
of or from some other cause, in which 
case the litigation cannot be said to 
affect the desired harmonious relations; 
or the parties will be in accord that the 
litigation is to their mutual benefit, 
in which case it can hardly be said to 
have a disruptive influence. 
Id. at 844. 
2. Collusive Lawsuits 
Mr. Forsman argues t h a t a l lowance of s u i t s between 
spouses w i l l lead to c o l l u s i v e l awsu i t s , s ince both spouses are 
l i k e l y to share in any r e c o v e r y . However, t h i s Court recent ly 
r e j e c t e d the c o l l u s i o n r a t i o n a l e with r e s p e c t to in t ra - fami ly 
s i t u a t i o n s in Fa rmers I n s u r a n c e Exchange v . C a l l , 712 P. 2d 
231 (Utah 1985) , where i t i n v a l i d a t e d a household e x c l u s i o n 
c l a u s e in an a u t o m o b i l e l i a b i l i t y i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . Ca l l 
concerned a claim by a f a t h e r , as guardian ad l i tem of a minor 
c h i l d , fo r i n j u r i e s a l l e g e d l y caused by the c h i l d ' s mother . 
Clear ly , the fa ther and mother both stood to p ro f i t from any 
recovery by the c h i l d , s i n c e such recovery would reduce t h e i r 
f i n a n c i a l burden of s u p p o r t . Even s o , t h i s Court re jec ted the 
col lus ion r a t i o n a l e , saying: 
[S]afeguards ex i s t to pro tec t insurers 
-8-
against unscrupulous collusive house-
holds. Insurers ... are not likely 
to be easy victims of fraudulent 
lawsuits. 
Id. at 236. 
3. Rewarding Defendant Spouse for Wrongdoing 
Mr. Forsman argues that to allow tort actions between 
spouses would have the effect of rewarding the spouse at fault 
for his or her wrongdoing. Mrs. Forsman respectfully submits 
that such a result, even if it did in fact occur, would be 
preferable to punishing the in no cent: spouse, by depriving 
him or her of recovery. 
The injured Plaintiff will have the burden of proof 
as to the elements of his or her claim, as well as his or her 
damages. If the Defendant is insured, the insurance company 
will provide competent defense. Only if the Plaintiff prevails 
will any award be made, and only to the extent of damages which 
the Plaintiff is able to prove. This will not be a "reward", 
but will be damages to which the Plaintiff is justly entitled. 
In Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, supra, an 
allegedly negligent mother was "rewarded" for her wrongdoing 
by allowing an action against her by her child. She stood to 
benefit from any recovery, which would lessen the parents' burden 
of support. Nevertheless, this Court allowed the action. 
4. Trivial or Spurious Lawsuits Between Spouses 
Mr. Forsman argues that to abolish interspousal 
immunity would allow suits between spouses over trivial matters, 
such as "taking out the garbage [and] unsatisfactory completion 
-9-
of other household duties and chores," (Respondent's Brief, at 
11), and cites a Florida case in which the wife sued for 
fraudulent inducement to marry. 
Such dangers have no bearing on the facts of this case, 
in which the Plaintiff suffered serious injuries in an automobile 
accident. Indeed, the possibility of spurious suits always 
exists, whether the parties are married or not, and is dealt 
with by denying recovery unless certain specific elements of 
a cause of action are proven. In Klein v. Klein, 26 Cal . 
Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962), in which California overruled 
its prior holdings so as to allow actions for negligence between 
spouses, the Court said: 
The argument about inundating the courts 
with trifling suits is palpably unsound. 
We have not been informed that such result 
has followed in any of the 18 states that 
have repudiated the old rule. 
Id. at 72. 
The solution to the possibility of spurious claims 
in an interspousal situation would be to hold that to enter a 
marriage constitutes consent to the ordinary frictions inherent 
in the relationship. This was proposed in McCurdy, Personal 
l.HiH£y. !£ 2.EJlJL_I*£JL^ ££I!_.£R£HJL£i!.' 4 Villanova Law Review 303 
(1959): 
The pertinent question should be whether 
there is unprivileged conduct tortious in 
character... Acts that are reasonable in 
view of the close relation, and carelessness 
in the operation of a home or in common 
activities should be distinguished 
from conduct not so referable and which 
would be actionable if the parties 
were not husband and wife. Courts should 
-10-
not be unable to deal with such distinctions. 
Id. at 338. 
Major trauma resulting from automobile injury is not 
an ordinary friction of marriage, and should not be treated as 
such. 
5. Legislative Declaration 
Mr. Forsman argues that abolition of the interspousal 
immunity doctrine would be a "departure from existinq public 
policy" which should be left to the legislature. (Respondent's 
Brief, at 12.) 
However, in Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404
 f 275 
P. 2d 696 (1954), this Court ££l££t.£l the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity in interpreting U.C.A. Sections 30-2-1 
through 30-2-8. The Court said: 
Giving these statutes a liberal 
construction to effect their objects 
and in the interest of justice 
requires us to hold that a wife can 
sue and be sued the same as if she 
were unmarried, even for the recovery 
of damages from her husband for 
intentional personal injury. 
Id. at 698. 
Later in Rubalcava v. Gisseman, supra, this Court, 
without leaving the question to the legislature, adopted the 
interspousal immunity rule with respect to negligent torts, even 
thouqh the subject statutes make no distinction whatsoever 
between intentional and negligent acts. Thus the holding in 
Rubalcava was itself inconsistent with the judicial restraint 
which Mr. Forsman now advocates. 
-11-
6. Summary 
The arguments advanced in favor of interspousal 
immunity from negligence actions are inconsistent with logic 
and with the more recent views of this Court. The policy of 
giving remedies to victims of tortious injuries should not be 
abrogated in favor of an obsolete rule. The District Court's 
application of that rule in this case should reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff should be permitted to present to the 
trial court her evidence of her due diligence and the State of 
Utah's misrepresentation with respect to her claim against Ronald 
G. Flinders. California law denying spousal immunity should 
be applied so as to allow this action between California 
domiciliaries. Utah should reject the spousal immunity doctrine, 
which is obsolete and unfair. Therefore, the District Court's 
summary judgments granted in favor of Ronald G. Flinders and 
George Forsman should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this /^A^day of 
1987. 
y. KENT HOLttHTC) 
GORDON J. SWENSON 
ANDERSON & 'HOLLAND 
623 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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